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Abstract 
 
Contemporary models of growth and development are founded on a category error: they ignore 
nature as a form of productive capital. Using as backdrop two recent books on the Indian 
economy that are representative of the prevailing orthodoxy, I review and in part extend an 
emerging literature that integrates development and environmental thinking. Contributors to the 
literature have reworked the economics of the household, communities, and other non-market 
institutions, reframed national accounting, reconstructed the theory of macro-economic 
development and public and trade policy, and revised the theory of collective action. In this 
paper I focus on a small part of the literature: economic evaluation. I develop the notion of 
sustainable development and construct a unified language for sustainability and policy analyses. 
I show that by economic growth we should mean growth in wealth - which is the social worth of 
an economy's entire set of capital assets - not growth in GDP nor the many ad hoc indicators of 
human development that have been proposed in recent years. The concept of wealth invites us to 
extend the notion of capital assets and the idea of investment well beyond conventional usage. I 
also show that by sustainable development we should mean development in which wealth (per 
head) adjusted for its distribution does not decline. This has radical implications for the way 
national accounts are prepared and interpreted. I then provide an account of a recent publication 
that has put the theory to work by studying the composition of wealth accumulation in 
contemporary India. Although much attention was given by the study's authors to the 
measurement of natural capital, due to a paucity of data the value of natural capital is 
acknowledged by them to be under-estimated, in all probability by a large margin. The study 
reveals that the entire architecture of contemporary development thinking is stacked against 
nature. These are still early days in the measurement of the wealth of nations, but both theory and 
the few empirical studies we now have at our disposal should substantially alter the way we 
interpret the progress and regress of nations.          
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"The best policies for alleviating malnutrition and poverty are those which increase growth and 
the competitiveness of the economy, for a growing and competitive economy facilitates a more 
even distribution of human capital and other assets and ensures higher incomes for the poor. 
Progress in the battle against malnutrition and poverty can be sustained if, and only if, there is 
satisfactory economic growth." (World Bank, World Development Report, 1986 : 7) 
 
"...long run economic growth is often slowed by widespread chronic food insecurity. People who 
lack energy are ill-equipped to take advantage of opportunities for increasing their productivity 
and output. That is why policymakers in some countries may want to consider interventions that 
speed up food security for the groups worst affected without waiting for the general effect of 
long-run growth." (S. Reutlinger and H. Pellekaan, Poverty and Hunger: Issues and Options for 
Food Security in Developing Countries, World Bank Publication, 1986: 6) 
 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1 The Development Orthodoxy 
A central message of modern development economics is the importance of income 
growth, by which is meant growth in gross domestic product (GDP). In theory, rising GDP 
creates employment and investment opportunities. And as incomes grow in a country where 
GDP was once low, households, communities, and government are able increasingly to set aside 
funds for the production of things that make for a good life. Today GDP has assumed such a 
significant place in the development lexicon, that if someone mentions "economic growth," we 
know they mean growth in GDP.2 
But if GDP is to grow, the State must establish conditions that create incentives to 
households, firms, communities, charities, and various layers of government to allocate goods 
and services in productive uses. The role of the State in economic development is thus both 
active (maintaining the rule of law and producing other public goods; investing in physical 
infrastructure, primary health-care, and education) and passive (permitting markets to operate; 
supporting freedom to express oneself). No doubt GDP growth in itself doesn't guarantee a 
reasonable distribution of incomes, but that only provides a case for including taxes and transfers 
on the government's agenda. Or so the argument would have it.  
1.1 Contrasting Views 
There are, however, two contrasting positions even within that argument, which are 
reflected in the quotations at the head of this article. That the publications from which the 
                                                 
2 An example is the recent interchange between Jagdish Bhagwati and Amartya Sen, in their letters 
to The Economist on July 13 and 20, 2013, respectively. Both refer to economic growth without finding it 
necessary to explain that they mean growth in GDP.     
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passages have been taken are from the same institution (The World Bank) and appeared in the 
same year (1986) is worth noting, because the views have been the source of a seemingly 
unending controversy. They have been revived once again in two recent books (Bhagwati and 
Panagariya, 2013; and Dreze and Sen, 2013) in which the authors assess India's economic 
performance since the early 1990s. Because the framework in which the pair of views has been 
constructed in the two books - more generally the argument itself - should have by now been 
retired, it will pay to recount them here.  
There is general appreciation that the programme of economic liberalization and 
structural reforms the Government of India initiated in the early 1990s gave rise to 
unprecedented economic growth for nearly two decades. During the first decade of this century 
GDP grew at an annual rate of 7.5 per cent. That was accompanied by improvements in a 
number of other economic indicators. For example the proportion of people whose incomes are 
below the country's official poverty line declined from 45 per cent in the early 1980s to 28 per 
cent in 2005. The decline is impressive, but the latter figure tells us that the country still harbours 
widespread deprivation. 
Over the years the persistence of inequities in India in the distribution of health and 
education has been a reason for complaint among social commentators. As the World Bank noted 
recently, 45 per cent of children under-5 are underweight and 25 per cent of women are illiterate, 
figures that are worse than the corresponding ones in a number of countries that are poorer in 
terms of GDP per head. So, if you look at changes that have taken place in the indicators of the 
quality of life in India since the early 1990s, the country would appear to be a winner. On the 
other hand, if you study the current figures in the country for the same indicators and compare 
them to those in some countries where GDP per head is lower, India would seem to be a loser. 
Depending on your perspective, the proverbial glass would appear to be either half full or half 
empty. 
Bhagwati and Panagariya (2013) begin by exposing a number of myths (their term) that 
critics have created about the country's recent performance in health, education, and the 
distribution of income. They recount that economic growth has come allied to improvements in a 
number of measures of education, health, and poverty. They go on to claim that the reforms 
necessary for successful economic development over the long run constitute two stages. First, 
there are to be what the authors call "Track I reforms," aimed at GDP growth, which enable the 
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poor to pull themselves up in the income ladder. Changes aimed at providing health care, 
education, and other forms of support for the poor, all of which would be made possible by the 
increased tax revenues from higher incomes, are Track II reforms. Without the former phase, the 
authors argue, there would be no finance to produce the latter benefits. They see the fast growth 
rates emanating from Track I reforms since the early 1990s as enabling the Indian government to 
move more fully to Track II in due course.  
The target in Dreze and Sen (2013) is the neglect by successive governments of health 
and education, which the authors interpret as having given rise to the enormous inequities that 
characterize the Indian economy. In contrast to Bhagwati and Panagariya, who study changes 
over time in India's socio-economic indicators, Dreze and Sen compare the current state of 
affairs in India with other poor countries and find India wanting. For Dreze and Sen the 
sequencing of Track I and Track II reforms is repugnant. They insist a far better pattern of 
economic development would have been one where GDP growth was to an extent traded off for 
more rapid improvements in health and education. The authors sift evidence from the 
experiences of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan among other successful countries to argue that 
the "extent" is in principle a lot less (and may even be negative) than what Bhagwati and 
Panagariya imagine, because improvements in health and education raise human productivity 
and so raise growth rates in GDP. The authors are exasperated with the patience the country's 
poor have displayed while waiting for better times, so the concluding chapters of their book are 
on the role deliberative democracy could play in stirring the electorate into action. 3 
1.2 Absent Nature 
Despite the vastly contrasting readings of the Indian experience, the analyses in the two 
books are based on a shared belief, one that is hallowed by tradition but should now be 
acknowledged to be utterly misconceived. They are built on a model which presumes that in any 
institutional setting, a combination of labour (more broadly human capital), knowledge, and 
reproducible capital is the basis of production, exchange, and consumption. Nature doesn't get a 
look in except as a bit player, nor is there a possibility that population pressure could contribute 
                                                 
3 A mistake is to claim that in contrast to the views of Dreze and Sen, the ones put forward by 
Bhagwati and Panagariya are "right wing". The mistake is made by Lawrence Haddad, Director of the 
Institute of Development Studies, Sussex, in his blog in July 2013. Authors of both books are anxious to 
discover the best route to long-term development. The pairs differ in their assessment of what that route 
should be. To invoke a "left-right" distinction in this context is sophomoric. 
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via habitat destruction to the persistence of poverty and hunger.  
Nature is life's support and promoting system, but orthodox development thinking is 
oblivious of its role as a capital asset. When the absence is noticed, those who advocate the 
priority of GDP growth in development policy say that nature is a luxury that can wait to be 
taken care of until the economy generates sufficient incomes. Intellectual support for the 
viewpoint was offered in the World Bank's World Development Report 1992, where the authors 
used data on air quality in urban sites to conclude that there is a U-shaped relationship between 
GDP and environmental quality. The relationship was christened, inevitably perhaps, as the 
"environmental Kuznets curve." The problem is, air quality is able to carry very little of nature's 
load. Air particulates blow away to other places within days, whereas a broken reef would take 
centuries to recover. Damage to natural capital is all too frequently irreversible. That is why as a 
metaphor for development prospects the environmental Kuznets curve should be rejected. 4 
A novel justification for excluding natural capital from economic models has been put 
forward implicitly by Dreze and Sen. They write (p. 42), "(i)f development is about enhancing 
human freedoms and the quality of life ... then the quality of the environment is bound to be part 
of what we want to preserve and promote." The authors would appear to regard that truth to be a 
license to ignore the economics of the natural environment. Devoting all of three pages to 
sustainable development, their remarks on the subject don't go beyond what is to be found 
routinely in Sunday supplements. They say, for example, that the Indian government has a plan 
to construct more than 600 dams on the Ganges and its tributaries. The authors don't like it, but 
don't tell us why, other than that there would be adverse environmental consequences. In a book 
that contains 35 pages explaining why education is good for us, readers should expect a 
paragraph or two explaining why dams are bad for us. The reasoning would seem to be that 
because nature is vital to the development of human capabilities, its worth is so deeply embodied 
in the value of those capabilities that it doesn't require unearthing. 5 
                                                 
4 For an early questioning of the environmental Kuznets curve, see Arrow et al. (1995). For a 
questioning of the statistical fit of even air quality and GDP, see Stern (2004). Bhagwati and Panagariya 
do not appeal to any such curve for justifying their neglect of natural capital. In developing their Track I 
and Track II sequence theoretically, they assume the various layers of government are taking account of 
environmental matters (Preface: xvi). But when applauding the structural reforms in India since the early 
1990s, they don't ask whether their assumption is justified. I return to this issue in Section 3.4.     
5 In a response to a reprint in Professor Brad DeLong's blog of 27 July 2013, of passages from my 
review (Dasgupta, 2013) of the Bhagwati-Panagariya and Dreze-Sen books, Ashok Rao stated the 
position explicitly. He wrote that as Dreze and Sen are concerned with extreme poverty and human 
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To state the position is to see what is wrong with it. It's all well and good to write 
eloquently, as Dreze and Sen do, about the role deliberative democracy can play in furthering 
economic development, but of what instrumental use is it if the basis on which citizens deliberate 
is innocent of the role a degraded nature plays at the poverty, population, and environment 
nexus? There are trade-offs between pretty much all we do and strive to be. They include trade-
offs between goods and services, which have to be assessed if one is to conduct economic 
evaluation. How else are we to judge whether draining a wetland to make way for a shopping 
mall is likely to promote human capabilities in the future, or whether cutting down upstream 
forests for timber and minerals is worth the heightened risk of severe floods and reductions in 
pollination and pest control downstream? 
GDP is incapable of recording those trade-offs. Recall that GDP is the market value of 
the flow of final goods and services in a year. The rogue word in the acronym is "gross", which 
means that the depreciation of capital assets isn't counted. If the wetland is drained to make way 
for the mall, the construction of the latter contributes to GDP but the destruction of the former 
goes unrecorded. Intuition tells us that if the social worth of the mall were less than the social 
value of the wetland, the economy's productive base would decline, which would then have 
adverse consequences for the current and future generations (we confirm the intuition in Section 
3 and Appendix 1). But GDP would signal otherwise. The seemingly more humane Human 
Development Index (HDI) of the United Nations misleads in the same way. An economy's GDP 
could be made to grow and its HDI made to improve for a time by "mining" natural capital 
(decimating forests, damaging soil, destroying fisheries, depleting rechargeable aquifers, 
reducing biodiversity). The good times couldn't go on forever though, because no economy can 
survive without natural capital. So both GDP and HDI would decline in due course. GDP does 
have an important role in economic analysis and policy (Appendix 2), but not as a welfare index.  
1.3 Environmental Externalities 
Bhagwati and Panagariya see government restrictions everywhere and Dreze and Sen 
can't take their eyes off health and education; but it's hard for some of us not to help noting also 
the pervasiveness of externalities, which are the unaccounted for consequences for others 
(including future people) of decisions made by each one of us on reproduction, consumption, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
development, they "... certainly address the environmental and social sustainability of growth." Rao also 
found ecology to be "a recurrent motif," in a book that says nothing about ecology nor how we are to 
measure the worth of ecosystems in supporting and promoting life. 
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use of the natural environment. In recent years the externalities present in the chain linking 
poverty, population growth, and degradation of the local natural-resource base in poor countries 
have been studied both theoretically and empirically. None of the three factors has been found to 
be a direct cause of the others; rather, each would appear to influence and be in turn influenced 
by the others. For example, a deterioration in the way a community manages the local woodland 
and water source or the way the government adjudicates property rights over forest land may 
mean an increase in the need for "hands" in each household, which then puts further pressure on 
the woodland and water source; and so on, in a cycle. Empowering women and expanding 
education certainly help to reduce fertility, but the externalities or spill-over effects just alluded 
to are a potent presence.6 
Over the past few decades a number of economists have worked to introduce nature into 
economics in a seamless way. It has required of them to rework the economics of the household, 
communities, and other non-market institutions, recast national accounting, reconstruct the 
theory of macro-economic development and public and trade policy, and revise the theory of 
collective action. The literature integrates development and environmental economics. 7 
                                                 
6 Dreze and Sen do touch upon externalities (pp. 90-94), but only in connection with the 
consequences of mining and burning coal, and with the dangers posed by nuclear reactors. 
 The temptation to over-reach when advancing one's views would seem to be irresistible. In an 
interview published in the August 2013 issue of Prospect, a current affairs magazine in the UK, Sen said 
in a rejoinder to the Bhagwati-Panagariya book that he knows of "no example of unhealthy, uneducated 
labour producing memorable growth rates." But by the reckoning advanced in his book with Dreze, India 
since the early 1990s is an example: GDP growth rates in the region of 6-8 per cent a year over a 20-year 
period should be regarded memorable when compared to the "Hindu growth rate" that characterized the 
country's performance during the four previous decades. In the interview Sen also remarked that "China's 
low fertility rates can be explained entirely by widespread education of girls and widespread economic 
independence of women." Are we to take it then that the Chinese government's "one child" policy was 
entirely pointless, or are we to regard the resulting bias in the gender ratio a goal of the government? 
7 The empirical literature on the pairwise links between population growth, poverty, and 
degradation of the local natural-resource base is now substantial. See in particular Jodha (1986, 2001), 
Agarwal and Narain (1989), Chopra, Kadekodi, and Murty (1989), CSE (1990), Ostrom (1990, 1992, 
1996), Somanathan (1991), Repetto et al. (1992), Baland and Platteau (1996), Noronha, (1997), 
Cavendish (2000), Kadekodi (2004), Ghate, Jodha, and Mukhopadhyay (2008), Pattanayak and Pfaff 
(2009), and Barbier (2010). The links between all three factors have been investigated by Chopra and 
Gulati (1998), Aggarwal, Netanyahu, and Romano (2001), and Filmer and Pritchett (2002). Revisions to 
the theory of international negotiations over climate change have been made by Barrett (2003), and on 
national environmental policy, by Sterner (2003). For a review of the empirical literature on the 
population-poverty-environment nexus and the development of their theoretical underpinnings, see 
Dasgupta (1993, 2000, 2005, 2010). Since its inauguration in 1996, the journal Environment and 
Development Economics, under the successive editorships of Charles Perrings and Anastasios 
Xepapadeas, has published many of the most significant empirical studies in this field by, among others, 
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Studies have uncovered connections between the spatially- localized persistence of rural 
poverty in the Indian sub-continent and the habitat destruction accompanying growth in GDP 
and population. The socio-environmental processes defining those links have been found to 
depend on the site and context. That means to borrow lessons from the development experience 
at one site, let alone one country, in order to inform policy in another is unre liable. The processes 
have been found also to be non- linear, in many cases significantly so. That in turn means such 
linear extrapolations of empirical data, as in the claim that "every 1 per cent increase in GDP per 
head reduces poverty by around 1.7 percent," (The Economist, June 1, 2013: 24), are misleading. 
It also means that the processes can harbour tipping points that portend a collapse of the natural 
resource-base and a sudden dramatic reduction in a community's economic prospects. The 
sources of such catastrophes can be population pressure and unprotected property rights over 
fragile resources. Imagine what would happen to a city's inhabitants if the infrastructure 
connecting it to the outside world were to break down without notice. Vanishing sources of 
water, deteriorating grazing fields, desiccated slopes, wasting mangroves, and bleached coral 
reefs are spatially confined instances of a corresponding breakdown among the rural poor. Civic 
strife and migration are often related phenomena. As the literature is informed by theory and 
increasingly validated by empirics, there is now cause to revise the orthodox view of economic 
life in both the small and the large.8 
This new literature has also increased our understanding of the strengths and limitations 
of collective action, household attitudes toward risk, and a number of salient socio-
environmental processes (for example, the dynamics of open-access resources). Space forbids 
discussing them further. My aim here is a lot more limited. It is to review the way the literature 
has reconstructed the foundations of economic evaluation. In what follows, readers could 
interpret an "economy" alternatively as a household, a village, a community, a district, a state, a 
nation, or indeed the entire world. But data are often compiled and published at the national 
level. So, when I come to report an empirical study on sustainable development, the economy is 
                                                                                                                                                             
young economists associated with the South Asian Network for Development and Environmenta l 
Economics (SANDEE). 
   
8 On the ubiquity of non-linearity in systems involving human-nature interactions and the 
hysteresis (in the extreme, irreversibility) inherent in the corresponding processes, see Dasgupta (1982, 
2004), Brander and Taylor (1998), Carpenter (2001), Dasgupta and Mäler (2003), Steffen et al. (2004), 
Lenton et al. (2008), and Scheffer (2009). A symposium in the Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences in 2011 studied links between biodiversity loss and poverty traps in sub-Saharan Africa. 
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taken to be a nation, namely, India.9 
1.4 Nature as a Regenerative Asset 
Contemporary models of economic growth and development regard nature to be a fixed, 
indestructible factor of production (Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2003; Helpman, 2004). The 
problem with the assumption is that it is wrong. Nature is a mosaic of degradable assets. 
Agricultural land, forests, watersheds, fisheries, fresh water sources, estuaries, wetlands, the 
atmosphere - more generally, ecosystems - are assets that are self-regenerative, but can suffer 
from deterioration or depletion through human use. (Oil and natural gas are at an extreme; they 
are non-renewable.) The term "self-regenerative" shouldn't be taken to mean that natural 
resources regenerate in isolation when left untouched by humans. Nature, or natural capital, is 
an interconnected body of assets undergoing change over time in size and character. The 
regenerative capacity of one depends on the mosaic of which it is a part. The processes driving 
those changes differ in spatial scales, operate at different speed, and are almost invariably non-
linear. It should be no cause for surprise that nature is "complex". 
Human activities affect nature's processes just as nature's processes influence the options 
we humans face and the choices we make. The mutual influence is so powerful today that to 
many scientists, talk of "nature's processes" makes little sense. To them "socio-environmental 
processes" is a more appropriate term. A few broad principles are understood, but the Devil lies 
in the details; and the details affect the daily lives of households everywhere. Substitution 
possibilities between reproducible capital and human capital, on the one hand, and vital forms of 
natural capital, on the other, become increasingly limited as the latter dwindles in size and 
quality (Ehrlich and Goulder, 2007). Unfortunately the cost of recovering those dwindling assets 
also increases, which is another way of saying that the processes suffer from hysteresis (worse, 
irreversibility). This is as true of village water holes and mangrove forests as it is of carbon 
concentration in the atmosphere. 
Some ecological stresses are global, while many are spatially localized; some occur 
slowly and may therefore miss detection until it's too late, while others are all too noticeable and 
                                                 
9 The discussion is based on Dasgupta (1982, 1993, 2004, 2005, 2010), Dasgupta and Mäler 
(1991), and Dasgupta and Ehrlich (2013). The required re-structuring of national economic accounts can 
be found in Repetto et al. (1989), Mäler (1991), Vincent (1997), Hartwick (2000), Arrow, Dasgupta, and 
Mäler (2003), UNU-IHDP/UNEP (2012), and the Report submitted by an Expert Group convened by the 
Government of India, on greening India's National Accounts (Anant et al., 2013). The case study I 
summarize in Section 4 is taken from Arrow et al. (2012). 
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a cause of persistent societal stresses. That may be why there is tension among the senses of 
urgency people express about carbon emissions and acid rains that sweep across regions, nations, 
and continents; on the stresses communities face when grasslands transform into shrub- lands; 
and on declines in firewood, biodiversity, water sources, and soil productivity that are specific to 
the needs and concerns of the poor in small, village communities.  
Because socio-environmental processes are imperfectly understood, environmental 
problems present themselves in different ways to people. Some identify environmental problems 
with population growth, while others identify them with wrong sorts of economic growth; then 
there are those who view the problems through the spectacle of poverty in poor countries. Each 
of those visions is correct. There is no single environmental problem; there is an innumerable 
collection of them. 
2 Natural Capital 
Why are environmental externalities pervasive and quantitatively significant? One reason 
is that property rights to prominent classes of natural capital are difficult to define and enforce. 
By property rights I mean not only private rights, but communitarian and public rights too. And 
one reason property rights are difficult to define, let alone to enforce, is natural capital's tendency 
to move. The wind blows, particulates diffuse, rivers flow, fish swim, birds and insects fly, and 
even earth worms are known to move. In extreme cases the market price of natural capital is nil 
even when they have considerable social worth. “Green” taxes would be a way to close the 
difference. 
The gap between the market price and social worth of natural capital has meant that 
technological innovations are biased against nature. Entrepreneurs, understandably, seek 
innovations that economize on expensive factors of production, not those that are cheap. It 
should be no surprise then that modern technology has proved to be rapacious in its use of 
nature’s services. In the absence of green taxes, public subsidy for the development of green 
technologies is a straightforward implication of this reasoning (Dasgupta, 2004). 
Natural capital is of direct use in consumption (fisheries), of indirect use as inputs in 
production (oil and natural gas; ecosystem services), and of use in both (air and water). The 
value of natural capital can be "utilitarian" (as a source of food or as a keystone species - many 
economists call it "use-value"); it can be aesthetic (places of scenic beauty), religious (sacred 
groves), intrinsic (primates); or it may be all those things (biodiversity). Their worth to us could 
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be from extraction (timber, gum, honey, leaves and barks, fish) or from their presence as a stock 
(forest cover, marshes, and reefs), or from both (watersheds). The stock could be an index of 
quality (air quality) or quantity. Quantity is sometimes expressed as a pure number (population 
size); in various other cases it is, respectively, (bio)mass, area, volume, depth. Even quality 
indices are often based on quantity indices, as in "parts per cubic centimetres" for measuring 
atmospheric haze. 
The above classification is useful in economic evaluation because it is based on the 
reasons we value nature. For understanding the changing landscape in contemporary economies, 
however, the classification in MEA (2005a-d) is more useful. Natural capital was classified in 
those publications in terms of the kinds of services they provide. Moreover, the focus was on 
ecosystems.10 
2.1 Valuing Ecosystems 
Apart from fisheries as sources of fish and forests as sources of timber, ecosystems have 
until recently been neglected by environmental and resource economists and national income 
statisticians. An ecosystem is a complex of the a-biotic environment and plant, animal, fungi, and 
microorganism communities, interacting as a functional unit. Among the visible products of 
ecosystems are food, fibres, fuel, and fresh water, but many remain hidden from view. 
Ecosystems maintain a genetic library, preserve and regenerate soil, fix nitrogen and carbon, 
recycle nutrients, control floods, mitigate droughts, filter pollutants, assimilate was te, pollinate 
crops, operate the hydrological cycle, and maintain the gaseous composition of the atmosphere. 
As those services aren't visible, it is all too easy to overlook them.  
Ecosystems offer joint products. Wetlands recycle nutrients and purify water; mangrove 
forests protect coastal land from storms and are spawning grounds for fish; and so on. Unhappily, 
social tensions arise in those many cases where an ecosystem has competing uses (farms versus 
forests versus urban development; forests versus agro-ecosystems; coastal fisheries versus 
aquaculture). Ultimately, a balance has to be struck among those demands, but the balance that’s 
                                                 
10 Theirs is a four-way classification of ecosystem services: (i) provisioning services (food, fibre, 
fuel, fresh water); (ii) regulating services (protection against natural hazards such as storms; the climate 
system); (iii) supporting services (nutrient cycling, soil production); and (iv) cultural services (recreation, 
cultural landscapes, aesthetic or spiritual experiences). Notice that cultural services and a variety of 
regulating services (such as disease regulation) contribute directly to human well-being, whereas others 
(soil production) contribute indirectly (by providing the means for growing food crops). Bateman et al. 
(2013) have used this classification to study the changing patterns of UK's landscape. 
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struck needs to be informed of the unseen benefits human societies enjoy from natural capital. 
That is why economic evaluation is a vital exercise. A much-publicized example of informed 
public discussion is the one that took place on the Catskill watershed in New York State, which 
operates as a natural filter, providing drinkable water to New York City. By the early 1990s, 
urbanization upstream had degraded the watershed to an extent that the city’s water supply was 
not drinkable. Purifying the water by means of a filtration system (reproducible capital) would 
have cost 6-8 billion dollars. Restoration of the watershed (investing in natural capital), which 
was the chosen alternative, cost 1-1.5 billion dollars. This was a case where the ecosystem could 
be revived at a relatively low cost. Many other cases, such as large-scale destruction of coral 
reefs, are to all intents and purposes irreversible. 
Because ecosystems are a mosaic of natural resources, the scope of an ecosystem is 
fashioned by the problem being studied. Some have an extensive reach ("biomes", such as the 
Savannah), there are those that cover regions (river basins), many involve clusters of villages 
(micro-watersheds), while others are confined to the level of a single village (the village pond). 
In each example there is an element of indivisibility. Divide an ecosystem into parts by creating 
barriers, and the sum of the productivities of the parts will typically be found to be lower than the 
productivity of the whole (other things being equal of course). The tropics house some of the 
most fragile ecosystems. MEA (2005a-d) provided an account of the stresses being experienced 
currently by both global and local ecosystems. Of the 24 that were investigated for the report, 15 
were found to be either degraded or used in an unsustainable way.  
The social worth of a piece of natural capital is its shadow price, familiar in cost-benefit 
analysis. An asset's shadow price is the present discounted value (PDV) of the flow of social 
benefits from the services it is forecast to provide. Measuring shadow prices thus requires (i) an 
understanding of the relevant socio-environmental processes (the dynamical system), (ii) 
knowledge of the size of assets (initial condition), and (iii) a conception of social well-being 
(ethical values). Here we focus on cases where the PDV is the sum of the asset's market price and 
the externalities arising from its use. If the market price is zero, the entire burden of estimating 
shadow prices falls on quantifying the relevant externalities.  
By social well-being in this article I mean a numerical aggregate that is built on 
individual well-beings but reflects in addition not only fairness in the allocation of goods and 
services among members of any given generation, but also among members of different 
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generations. The conception is thus responsive to both intra- and inter-generational efficiency 
and intra- and inter-generational equity. 
Social well-being is sometimes referred to as "aggregate well-being," to highlight the 
special case where it is the weighted sum of individual well-beings (e.g., as in total 
utilitarianism). Policy analysis is usually undertaken in terms of an aggregate measure. That is 
why, when introducing the idea of sustainable development I work with an aggregate 
(Propositions 1-2). Later in Section 3, however, I show that sustainability analysis invites us to 
work with social well-being, averaged over people across the generations (e.g., as in average 
utilitarianism; see footnote 16). The move has no bearing on policy analysis (e.g. project 
evaluation) if population forecasts are independent of marginal changes in policy, but otherwise 
it has a deep significance even there. Propositions 3-6 are cast in terms of the average measure of 
social well-being. 
Requirements (i)-(iii) tell us that estimating shadow prices involves comparing 
hypothetical perturbations to an economy to the status quo, as in the question, "What would the 
contribution to social well-being be if an extra unit of an asset were made available to the 
economy free of charge?" That means shadow prices can't be calculated merely on the basis of 
the shape of things to come; the exercise also requires forecasts of the shapes of things that 
would come if the current portfolio of assets were to be otherwise. Forecasts therefore require 
thinking through counterfactuals. Good forecasts are no mere guesses. Conditions (i)-(ii) are the 
key to economic forecasts. Condition (iii) has a separate, though related status; it enables the 
evaluator to place a value on perturbations. 
Shadow prices simultaneously reflect the asset trade-offs an economy would face if social 
well-being were to be held fixed. Which is why deriving shadow prices is one of the hardest 
empirical problems in economics. Short cuts have been tried - by soliciting people's willingness 
to pay for conserving natural capital (the "stated preference" approach), studying how much 
people actually pay to enjoy their services (the "revealed preference" approach), and so on. 
Those methods are useful in the case of environmental amenities (e.g., places of scenic beauty) 
but not of factors of production (forest cover). More empirical studies of the value of ecosystem 
services are now sorely needed.11 
                                                 
11 On eliciting people's preferences over environmental resources from, respectively, what they say 
in response to questions asked of them and from what they are observed to do, see Smith (1997) and 
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2.2 Pollution vs. Conservation 
Pollutants are the reverse side of natural capital. One way to conceptualize "pollution" is 
to consider the depreciation of capital assets. Acid rains damage forests; industrial seepage and 
discharge reduce water quality in streams and underground reservoirs; sulfur emissions corrode 
structures and harm human health; and so on. The damage inflicted on each type of asset 
(buildings, forests, fisheries, human health) should be interpreted as depreciation. The task then 
is to estimate the depreciation amounts. 
Corrosion of buildings and structures is frequently estimated by their replacement cost. 
This is an imperfect procedure. The correct way would be to estimate the loss in output owing to 
the corrosion. But that can prove to be hard. As another example, consider that damage to health 
should be estimated by (a) loss in human productivity, (b) the direct loss in well-being in 
experiencing pain and discomfort, and (c) reduction in life expectancy. It is fortunate for 
humanity that good health offers the three benefits more or less as joint-products. But to the best 
of my knowledge, no one has estimated all three losses in studies of the damage environmental 
pollution causes to human health. The point remains though that there is no reason to distinguish 
resource management problems from pollution management problems. Roughly speaking, 
"resources" are "goods", while "pollutants" (the degrader of resources) are "bads". Pollution is 
the reverse of conservation. 
The mirror-symmetry between conservation and pollution is well illustrated by the 
atmosphere, which is both vital for human activity and a sink for pollutants. The atmosphere is a 
public good (if air quality is improved, we all enjoy the benefits, and none can be excluded from 
enjoying the benefits). It is also a common pool for pollution. That it is a public good means the 
private benefit from improving air quality is less than the social benefit. Without collective 
action there is underinvestment in air quality. In contrast, as the atmosphere is a common pool 
into which pollutants can be deposited, the private cost of pollution is less than the social cost. 
Without collective action, there is an excessive use of the pool as a sink for pollutants. Either 
                                                                                                                                                             
Freeman (2002). Haque, Murty, and Shyamsundar (2011) are excellent collections of studies on valuation 
of ecosystem services. Pattanayak and Butri (2005), Barbier (2007), Kumar (2010) , and Kareiva et al. 
(2011) are pioneering studies estimating the value of ecosystem services that are inputs in production. 
However, in two reviews of the literature, Pattanayak and Pfaff (2009) and Ferraro et al. (2012), conclude 
that we are still far from understanding even apparently simple human-nature interactions. For further 
empirical studies, see various issues of Environment and Development Economics. A key characteristic of 
ecosystems is their biodiversity. For a comprehensive account of the ecology and economics of 
biodiversity, see Perrings (2014). 
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way, the atmosphere suffers from the "tragedy of the commons." 
3 Economic Evaluation 
Economic evaluation isn’t a prerogative of people fortunate enough to live in well-
ordered societies. Even in the most dysfunctional of polities there are concerned citizens who 
would like to weigh matters sympathetically, but judiciously, before assessing the performance of 
their economy and arriving at a view on what policies should be pursued. The theory I develop 
below accommodates such people. There is no presumption that the world they inhabit functions 
equitably or efficiently. 
I shall refer to the person doing the evaluation as the “social evaluator”. The social 
evaluator could be a citizen (thinking about things before casting her vote on political 
candidates), he could be an ethicist employed by government to offer guidance, she could be a 
public servant, and so on. 
Economic evaluation involves comparing perturbations to an economy to the status quo. 
It comes in two forms: sustainability analysis and policy analysis. What are they and how do 
they differ? 
An object is "sustained" when it doesn't diminish over time. So, sustainability analysis 
involves evaluating the change an economy undergoes across the passage of time. This is to be 
contrasted with the more familiar policy analysis (e.g. project evaluation), which involves 
evaluating the perturbation to an economy caused by a policy change (e.g. an investment project) 
at a moment in time. In what follows I don't specify the ethical basis of economic evaluation. 
The idea of social well-being, introduced earlier, has a wide reach. The social evaluator could be 
someone wedded to one of a wide variety of utilitarian theories, or to an empirical notion of 
happiness, or to a theory that pays particular attention to human rights, and so on. I want to keep 
the interpretation of social well-being unspecified because the foundations of sustainability and 
policy analysis don't depend on it.  
3.1 Sustainable Development 
In his interview in the August 2013 Issue of Prospect magazine, Amartya Sen asked, "Is 
growth inescapably damaging to the environment?" and mused, "I don't think so." Fortunately, 
we have the required grammar for going beyond speculation.  
World Commission (1987), commonly known as the Brundtland Commission Report, 
defined "sustainable development" to be "... development that meets the needs of the present 
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without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." Stated another 
way, the requirement is for each generation to bequeath to its successor at least as large a 
productive base, relative to their populations, as it had itself inherited.  
The requirement is derived from a relatively weak notion of social well-being. 
Sustainable development in the Brundtland Commission's sense demands that members of future 
generations have no less of the means to meet their needs than we do ourselves, it demands 
nothing more. (It doesn't require, for example, that development be optimal.) But how is a 
generation to judge that it is leaving behind an adequate productive base for its successor? 
Moreover, shouldn't sustainable development be defined in terms of social well-being rather than 
an economy's productive base? 
An economy's productive base is a means to protecting and promoting well-being across 
the generations. What we want is a measure of the base whose movements over time mimic those 
of social well-being. It transpires that the required measure is the social worth of an economy's 
stock of capital assets. An asset's social worth is its "shadow" value. So it is natural to call the 
total worth of assets, wealth. 
Formally, let Ki(t) be the economy's stock of asset i at t and Pi(t) its shadow price. 
Write 
W(t) = iΣ[Pi(t)Ki(t)].         (1) 
W(t) is the economy's wealth at t.12 
If an economy's institutions are weak or simply bad, the shadow prices of those same 
assets would be small, and that would translate into a low value of wealth. Institutions (more 
broadly, "social capital") can be thought of as enabling assets, contributing to the social worth of 
those durable goods that go to define wealth.  
Identifying assets is no simple matter. The social evaluator is obliged to go beyond usual 
classifications of goods and services. Because the size and composition of present and future 
populations are built into the notion of social well-being, they should be included in the list of 
assets. Moreover, material assets should be identified not only by their physical and chemical 
attributes, but also by location, date, and contingency. As equality in the distribution of well-
                                                 
12 What we are calling "wealth" has been named in turn "inclusive wealth" by UNU-IHDP/UNEP 
(2012) and "comprehensive wealth" by Arrow et al. (2012, 2013). The adjectives serve the purpose of 
reminding readers that the list of assets contains many goods that are typically absent from national 
accounts.  
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beings among contemporaries is a desired objective of social policy, assets should be identified 
also by the identities of people who have claims to them. As shadow prices are the rates at which 
assets can be traded off against one another while keeping social well-being constant, they 
provide the required link between an economy's productive base and well-being across the 
generations. It would mean that the shadow price of a property belonging to someone poor is 
higher than that of the same property if it were owned by someone wealthy. Differences between 
those shadow prices are "distributional weights", whose use however has proved to be 
controversial in social cost benefit analysis. A rough and ready alternative to naming assets in 
terms of their ownership is to keep inequality in the distribution of well-being among 
contemporaries separate from inequalities across the generations and include a separate index of 
inequality among contemporaries. The Gini coefficient of wealth inequality suggests itself.  
To see why wealth is the index we are looking for in sustainability analysis, let ΔX denote 
a small change in any variable X. Consider a short interval of time Δt that begins at t. We write 
the change in Ki over the interval by ΔKi(t). From equation (1) it follows that the change in 
wealth over the interval is 
ΔW(t) = iΣPi(t)ΔKi(t).
13        (2) 
Let V(t) be an index of the well-being of people alive at t and the potential well-being of 
those who are forecast to be alive after t. V(t) is social well-being at t. By sustainable 
development over the period [t, t+Δ] let us mean that V at end of the period should be no less 
than what it was at the start of the period, which is to say, V(t+Δt) ≥ V(t). We denote the 
difference by ΔV(t). In Appendix 1 it is shown that 
ΔV(t) = ΔW(t) = iΣPi(t)ΔKi(t).        (3) 
Equation (3) can be summarized as 
Proposition 1: Social well-being increases during a short interval of time if and only if 
wealth also increases. 
The Proposition says that if we interpret sustainable development to require that social 
well-being shouldn't decline over time, we should be asking whether wealth is increasing and is 
likely to increase in the future.14 Proposition 1 also says that in sustainability analysis assets 
                                                 
13 Pi(t) is held constant in the formula because by definition it is a measure of the value of a unit 
change in Ki(t).    
14 Equation (3) represents the equivalence between changes in wealth and social well-being, 
respectively, in a short interval of time. The idea of sustainable development over the long-run can be 
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should be valued at their shadow prices. In contrast, the trade-offs postulated among the 
components of such aggregate indices as HDI are ad hoc; they aren't rooted in any well-defined 
notion of social well-being. That is why they are of no use in the study of sustainable 
development.15 
Define net domestic product (NDP) as GDP minus the depreciation of capital assets. It is 
an easy matter to prove that wealth increases during a short interval of time if and only if 
aggregate consumption does not exceed NDP. So we have 
Proposition 2: Social well-being increases during a short interval of time if and only if 
aggregate consumption does not exceed net domestic product. 
Proposition 2 shows that sustainable development displays a particular form of prudence. 
It requires that resources be set aside for the future so as to expand the productive base.  
3.2 Population Growth 
Even though Propositions 1-2 are intuitively appealing, they have a disquieting feature. 
Imagine that wealth grows at 1 percent a year while population grows at an annual rate of 2 per 
cent. The economy's wealth would be growing even though individuals would be getting poorer. 
To ignore the latter is unseemly. The problem here resembles the class ic tension between total 
and average utilitarianism. That earlier literature, however, studied timeless societies. Here we 
have a dynamic system in need of ethical repair. One way out of the dilemma is to include 
population as a separate capital asset and interpret the Propositions accordingly, which is how 
Propositions 1 and 2 should be read. Another way is to reconstruct social ethics in terms of the 
well-being of the average person across the generations. 16 
                                                                                                                                                             
obtained by summing both sides of the equation over short intervals. For details see Dasgupta (2004, 
2009).  
15 HDI is a weighted combination of GDP per head, life expectancy at birth, and literacy. The 
weights aren't derived from any known welfare considerations. Ravallion (2012) has shown that under the 
version of HDI proposed in UNDP (2010), the value of longevity in Zimbabwe is 0.51 US dollars per 
year. That means if Zimbabwe's authorities were to make a policy change that increases national income 
by a mere 0.52 US dollars per person per year at the cost of reducing average life expectancy by one year 
(other things remaining the same), the country will have promoted human development. That simply can't 
be right.  
16 To illustrate, let time be continuous and denoted by s and t (s ≥ t). We label people at each 
moment by j. Denote the flow of well-being to person j at time s as Uj(s) and let N(s) be population size at 
s. Consider by way of example an ethical viewpoint where δ (≥ 0) is the rate at which future U's are 
discounted and social well-being at date t is taken to be 
 
 V(t) = t∫
∞
[jΣUj(s)exp(-δ(s-t))]ds. 
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Fortunately under certain simplifying assumptions Proposition 1 can be reconstructed in 
terms of wealth per capita. 
Proposition 3: Social well-being adjusted for the distribution of wealth in each 
generation and averaged over people across the generations increases over a short period of 
time if and only if wealth per capita increases.17 
Similarly, to allow for population growth, Proposition 2 under those same simplifying 
assumptions can be reconstructed as 
Proposition 4: Social well-being increases during a short interval of time if and only if 
consumption per head does not exceed net domestic product per capita. 
Even though they are only approximations to Proposition 1, Propositions 3 and 4 are 
enormously useful, because by measuring assets in per capita terms the social evaluator is able 
to avoid regarding population as a separate asset. Proposition 3 says that by "economic growth" 
we should mean growth in wealth, not growth in GDP. Similarly it says by intra-generational 
inequality we should mean inequality in the distribution of wealth, not income; and by poverty a 
paucity of wealth, not low income. The aim shouldn't be to maximize the rate of wealth 
accumulation; it should be to optimize the rate. Estimating stocks is no doubt hard work, but it 
shouldn't be avoided. Because GDP doesn't record the degradation of natural capital, the term 
"green GDP" is an utter misnomer. 
In a severely distorted economy a government may be able to have its proverbial cake 
and eat it too. By a judicious choice policy it may be possible to accumulate wealth per capita 
and enjoy modest increases in GDP per head for a while. Only further work in wealth accounting 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
 Then social well-being averaged over people across the generations would be  
 
 V(t)/{t∫
∞
[N(s)exp(-δ(s-t))]ds} = t∫
∞
[jΣUj(s)exp(-δ(s-t))]ds/{t∫
∞
[N(s)exp(-δ(s-t))]ds}. 
17 For proofs of the equivalence, in increasing generality, see Hamilton and Clemens (1998), 
Dasgupta and Mäler (2000), Dasgupta (2004, 2009), and Arrow, Dasgupta, and Mäler (2003a,b). The 
technically minded reader will know that averaging social well-being over people across the generations 
does not change the formulation of intergenerational ethics that is generally in use in policy analysis (e.g., 
Chakravatry, 1969). But it makes a difference, for the better, in sustainability analysis.  
 Wealth is the dynamic counterpart of income. The welfare significance of national income was 
explored by Hicks (1940), Samuelson (1961), Mirrlees (1969), and Sen (1976), among many others. As 
the authors confined themselves to perturbations of stationary states, their findings have no empirical 
import. Only Samuelson addressed the problems a dynamic economy poses for the national accountant. In 
the final page of his article Samuelson speculated that something like a wealth index is needed for 
economic evaluation, but provided no argument.  
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will show whether that is the case today. The empirical work on sustainable development 
reported in Section 4 is suggestive of the possibility.  
3.3 Policy Analysis 
Policy analysis (e.g., appraising investment projects) involves evaluating perturbations to 
an economy at a point in time. Consider a proposal for an investment project, to be initiated at 
date t. The project involves transferring assets at t to the project from those activities in which 
they would be deployed under the status quo. The transfers amount to a perturbation to the 
economy, with long run consequences. If the project is small relative to the size of economy, the 
social value of the perturbation is 
ΔW(t) = iΣ[Pi(t)ΔKi(t)].        (4) 
The perturbation doesn't affect shadow prices because the project is small. The social 
evaluator would be required to estimate "consumer surpluses" if the project were not small. In 
equation (4) the ΔKi(t)s are the quantities of assets transferred from one set of activities to 
another. Of course, in a closed economy, their physical magnitudes at t wouldn't change (ΔKi(t) < 
0 in the activity from which i is to be displaced, and ΔKi(t) > 0 in the project to which i would be 
placed). But as i's shadow price in the two activities would differ, ΔW(t) is not zero. 
Equation (4) says that the coin on the basis of which we should evaluate the project is 
wealth. That could seem odd, in as much as the conventional criterion for evaluating investment 
projects is the present discounted value (PDV) of the flow of social profits. But it can be shown 
that the PDV in question is the project's impact on wealth (Dasgupta, 2004). Formally, we have  
Proposition 5: The PDV of social profits from a project is positive if and only if the 
project gives rise to an increase in wealth.18 
Proposition 5 is intuitively appealing. Being the (weighted) sum of social profits, a 
project's PDV has the dimensions of stock. Wealth also has the dimensions of stock. The 
Proposition says that a project's PDV is the change in wealth occasioned by it. In an optimally 
managed economy the PDV of the marginal investment project would be zero. Proposition 5 says 
that correspondingly the assets that have been inherited from the past are so deployed in an 
optimizing economy that wealth is at its maximum at each date. Taken together Propositions 1 
and 3 tell us that the criterion we should use for economic evaluation is wealth. The equivalence 
between wealth and social well-being is at the heart of normative development economics.  
                                                 
18 For details see Dasgupta (2004: Appendix).      
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3.4 Enlarging the Scope of Assets 
Historically, assets were taken to possess three features shared by commonplace durable 
goods such as land, buildings, and machines. First, the good is an input in production. Second, it 
gives rise to an additional flow of consumption, the present discounted value of which can be 
realized in the market. And third, the good can be alienated (transferred to another individual) 
with no change in value.19 
For economic evaluation this is too narrow a point of view. Propositions 1-5 tell us that 
by assets we should mean the state variables of the socio-environmental processes driving the 
economy. Health and education possess the first two features but not the third. That may be why 
neither is regarded as an asset in national accounts, where they appear as consumption 
expenditure. But both education and health are state variables in any plausible account of the 
processes that drive an economy. That is why they should be entered as capital assets. 
What one means by a state variable is also in part a matter of discretion. Leaving aside 
questions of aggregation, the social evaluator faces a choice. It may, for example, seem natural to 
regard "knowledge" to be an asset (as in "knowledge capital"). But if knowledge is an output of 
domestic R&D, the capital inputs in R&D (scientific equipment, human capital) could substitute 
for knowledge itself. In contrast, suppose the economy freely applies knowledge that is produced 
elsewhere. Growth of knowledge in the domestic economy would then be exogenous, and 
increases in knowledge would be recorded as growth in total factor productivity, otherwise 
known as the "residual." Note though that the residual is a mathematical transform of the passage 
of time, which means time itself is an asset. If that seems non- intuitive, an alternative would be 
to embed knowledge in the quality of other assets and measure the latter in efficiency units. In 
theory it makes no difference which route is taken (Arrow et al., 2013). A coarse partition of 
assets in Proposition 3 would comprise reproducible capital (roads, ports, cables, buildings, 
machines, equipment), human capital (education, health), knowledge (the arts, humanities, and 
sciences), and natural capital (ecosystems, sources of water, the atmosphere, land, sub-soil 
resources). In Section 4 we make use of this classification.  
3.5 The Idea of Investment 
Equation (2) denotes the change in wealth caused by a perturbation to the economy. 
Suppose the perturbation is the passage of time. Divide both sides of equation (2) by Δt to obtain 
                                                 
19 I am grateful to Kenneth Arrow for discussions on the idea of capital.  
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ΔW(t)/Δt = iΣPi(t)ΔKi(t)/Δt.        (5) 
When applied to Proposition 3, equation (5) reads as 
Proposition 6: Social well-being (adjusted for the distribution of wealth in each 
generation and averaged over people across the generations) increases if and only if investment 
per head (adjusted for the distribution of investment across contemporaries) is positive. 
If Proposition 6 reads oddly, it is because the word "investment" carries with it a sense of 
robust activism. When the government invests in roads, the picture that is drawn is of bulldozers 
levelling the ground and tarmac being laid. But the notion of capital extends beyond reproducible 
assets to include human capital, knowledge, and natural capital. So we need to stretch the notion 
of "investment", which in Proposition 6 includes the growth of renewable natural resources such 
as ecosystems. To leave a forest unmolested would be to invest in the forest; to allow a fishery to 
re-stock under natural conditions would be to invest in the fishery; and so on. 20 
That suggests investment amounts to deferred consumption, but the matter is subtler. 
Providing additional food to undernourished people via, say, food guarantee schemes not only 
increases their current well-being, it enables them also to be more productive in the future and to 
live longer. Because their human capital increases, the additional food intake should count also 
as investment. Note though that food intake by the well-nourished doesn't alter their nutritional 
status, which means the intake is consumption, not investment. Equation (5) says that by "net 
investment" in an asset we should mean the value of the change in its stock. This has a number of 
implications for national income accounting (Anant et al., 2013). It means, for example, that 
"defensive expenditures" (i.e., resources deployed to mitigate environmental pollution) should be 
deducted from investment figures. Such expenditure enters GDP in a positive light, but they 
don't add to wealth. 
To illustrate Proposition 6 further, consider a closed, egalitarian economy with constant 
population. Suppose in a given year it invests 40 billion dollars in reproducible capital, spends 20 
billion dollars on primary education and health care, and depletes and degrades its natural capital 
by 70 billion dollars. The economy's System of National Accounts (SNA) would record the 40 
billion dollars as investment ("gross capital formation"), the 20 billion dollars as consumption, 
                                                 
20 What we are calling "net investment" has been called "genuine saving" by Hamilton and Clemens 
(1998) and "inclusive investment" by IHDP/UNEP (2012). Note also that net investment per capita in 
Proposition 6 should be interpreted as the rate at which per capita wealth changes, it is not net aggregate 
investment divided by population size. Economic evaluation requires estimates of stocks.     
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and remain silent on the 70 billion dollars of loss in stocks of natural capital. Proper accounting 
methods in contrast would reclassify the 20 billion dollars as expenditure in the formation of 
human capital ("investing in the young", as the saying goes) and the 70 billion dollars as 
depreciation of natural capital. Aggregating them and assuming that expenditure on education is 
a reasonable approximation to gross human-capital formation, we would conclude that owing to 
the depreciation of natural capital the economy's wealth will have declined over the year by 10 
billion dollars; and that's before taking note of the depreciation of reproducible and human 
capital. The moral we should draw is that development was unsustainable that year.  
Sustainable development is different from optimum development. One can imagine a 
sustainable development path involving excessively high rates of investment. The idea of 
sustainable development is of immense value as a check against profligacy by the current 
generation; but a programme of accumulation can be sustainable and be a burden on the current 
generation. 
3.6 Trade, Externalities, and Wealth Transfers 
Proposition 3 tells us also to curb our enthusiasm for free trade in a distorted world. 21 To 
illustrate why, imagine that timber concessions have been awarded in an upstream forest of a 
poor country by its government so as to raise export revenue. As forests stabilize both soil and 
water flow and are a habitat for birds and insects (in the words of MEA, 2005a-d, these are 
"regulatory” and “provisioning” services), deforestation erodes soil, increases water run-off, and 
reduces pollination and pest control downstream. If the law recognizes the rights of those who 
suffer damage from deforestation, the timber company would be required to compensate 
downstream farmers. But compensation is unlikely when the cause of damage is many miles 
away and the victims are scattered groups of farmers. Problems are compounded because 
damages are not uniform across farms, their geography matters. Moreover, downstream farmers 
may not even realize that the decline in their farms' productivity is traceable to logging upstream. 
The timber company's operating cost would in those circumstances be less than the social cost of 
deforestation (the latter, at least as a first approximation, would be the firm's logging costs and 
the damage suffered by all who are adversely affected). So the export would contain an implicit 
subsidy (the "externality"), paid for by people downstream. And I haven't included forest 
                                                 
21 The example is taken from Dasgupta (1990) and the empirical substantiation in Pattanayak and 
Butry (2005) and Kareiva et al. (2011). 
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inhabitants, who now live under even more straightened circumstances. The subsidy is hidden 
from public scrutiny, but Proposition 3 says that it amounts to a transfer of wealth from the 
exporting to the importing country. Ironically, some of the poorest people in the exporting 
country would be subsidizing the incomes of the average importer in what could well be a rich 
country. That can't be right.  
4 Empirics 
Proposition 1 is the sustainability theorem in its pristine form. If we are to apply it, assets 
will have to be re-classified so as to conform to limitations of data. Proposition 3 is an 
approximation of Proposition 1. Empirical work requires further approximations and analysts are 
forced to cut corners. Proposition 1 is nevertheless essential for even the most hard-boiled 
empiricist. If national income statisticians were to remain unaware of it, they wouldn't know 
what corners they would be obliged to cut.  
Arrow et al. (2012, 2013) and IHDP-UNU/UNEP (2012) have made an initial try at 
applying Proposition 3. Their publications are like reconnaissance exercises. They explore the 
land mostly in the dark; you know they've got it wrong, but you have reasons to believe they're in 
the right territory. 
4.1 Wealth in India: Estimates 
Arrow et al. (2012) put Proposition 3 to work by estimating the change in wealth per 
capita over the period 1995-2000 in Brazil, China, India, United States, and Venezuela. 22 The 
choice of countries was in part designed to reflect different stages of economic development and 
in part to focus on particular resource bases. Because of an absence of data, the authors didn't 
study wealth inequality within countries. In what follows I summarize the steps they took to 
enquire whether economic development in India was sustained during the five years in question. 
Details can be found in their paper.  
Table 1 provides estimates of wealth per capita in 1995 and its growth during the 
following five years. Columns (1)-(2) provide estimates of stocks per capita for 1995 and 2000, 
respectively, for three categories of assets: reproducible capital (row (1)); human capital, divided 
into education and health (rows (2)-(3)); and natural capital (row (4)).  
The value of reproducible capital in 1995, amounting to $1,530 per head, was calculated 
from government publications on past capital investments. The implicit assumption was that 
                                                 
22 IHDP-UNU/UNEP (2012) used the same framework to measure wealth in 120 countries.  
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prices used by the government to record expenditures are reasonable approximations of shadow 
prices. Using the methods summarized in Klenow and Rodriguez-Clare (2005), the value of 
education per person ($6,420) was estimated on the basis of a functional relationship between 
wage differences and differences in levels of education.  
No data are currently available for calculating the contribution of health to labour 
productivity and current well-being. For that reason the authors studied longevity only. Its 
shadow price was estimated from the value of a statistical life (VSL), which is commonly 
obtained from the willingness-to-pay for a marginal reduction in the risk of death. Recent work 
suggests VSL in India is approximately $500,000. Arrow et al. (2012) showed that under a set of 
simplifying assumptions VSL equals the value of health per person (row (3), column (1)). They 
then estimated the value of a statistical life-year and used that to value the increase in life 
expectancy between 1995 and 2000 (row (3), column (2)).  
Four categories of natural capital were included in the study: forests (valued for their 
timber), oil and minerals, land, and carbon concentration in the atmosphere. Like institutions and 
knowledge, atmospheric carbon was interpreted to be an "enabling" asset, which is why it is 
excluded from columns (1) and (2) but included in the estimate of the change in wealth over the 
5-year period. 
The value of land was taken from World Bank (2011). Using market prices for timber and 
oil and minerals, the shadow value of natural capital in 1995 was estimated to be $2,300 per 
person (row (4), column (1)). Because of the lack of relevant data, the figure doesn't include the 
value of all the many ecological services that forests provide. Moreover, ecosystems such as 
fisheries, wetlands, mangroves, and water bodies are missing from Table 1. That means $2,300 is 
an underestimate, in all probability seriously so. Adding the figures, wealth per capita in 1995 
was found to be $510,250 (row (5), column (1)).  
Population in India grew at an average annual rate of 1.74 per cent. Column (3) records 
changes in per capita capital stocks over the period in question; and column (4) presents the 
corresponding annual rates of change. The former is embellished by two factors. First, India is a 
net importer of oil, whose real price rose during the period. The capital losses owing to that 
increase amounted to wealth reduction in India, which was calculated to be $140 per person (row 
(5), column (3)). Secondly, during 1995-2000 global carbon emissions into the atmosphere was 
over 38 billion tons. At current levels of concentration (380 parts per million in 1995) carbon is a 
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global "public bad". The theory of public goods says that the loss to India over the period would 
have been global emissions times the shadow price of carbon specific to India. In their base case 
Arrow et al. (2012) took the global shadow price to be minus $50 per ton. Using the estimates of 
Nordhaus and Boyer (2000), the loss to India per ton of carbon emissions was taken to be 5% of 
the global shadow price, which is minus $2.50. This amounted to a loss per person of $90 (row 
(6), column (3)). 
Row (7) records the change in wealth per capita in India over the period 1995-2000. It 
translates to 0.20% a year, a figure so near to zero as to be alarming. However, the estimate 
doesn't include improvements in knowledge and institutions. Arrow et al. (2012) modelled the 
latter as "enabling assets" and interpreted improvements in them as growth in total factor 
productivity (TFR), which in India has been estimated to be 1.84% a year (row (8)). Based on a 
formula the authors derived for including the residual in wealth calculations, row (9) records the 
annual rate of growth of wealth per head in India during 1995-2000 as having been 2.04%. 
4.2 Wealth in India: Commentary 
The composition of wealth in Table 1 doesn't have direct implications for policy. A mere 
study of the relative magnitudes of the different forms of wealth wouldn't tell us their relative 
importance. Suppose, for example, that the value of asset i swamps all other forms of capital, by 
a factor of 1000. That doesn't mean investment ought to be directed at further increases in i, for 
we don't know the costs involved in doing so. Only social cost-benefit analysis, using the same 
shadow prices as are estimated for sustainability analysis, would tell the evaluator which 
investment projects are socially desirable.  
Taken at face value Table 1 reveals a number of interesting characteristics of India's 
economic development during the final years of the twentieth century. It is as well to highlight 
the most striking: 
1. Of the four types of capital comprising measured wealth, reproducible capital is the 
smallest. Even though the value of natural capital in both years is in all likelihood a serious 
underestimate, it was considerably greater in 1995 than reproducible capital.  
2. The rapid growth of reproducible capital (7.30% a year), as against a 0.15% annual rate 
of decline of natural capital meant that by 2000 their stocks were pretty much the same.  
3. In 1995 human capital in the form of education was over four times that of 
reproducible capital. But the ratio declined over the 5-year period owing to a slower growth in 
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education. 
4. Health swamps all other forms of wealth. That it is some two orders of magnitude 
larger than all other forms of wealth combined in what was in 1995 a low-income country is 
unquestionably the most striking result and will no doubt come as a surprise to readers. That the 
finding is a cause for surprise is, however, no reason for dismissing it. Health has been much 
discussed in the development literature but hasn't been valued within the same normative theory 
as reproducible capital. There was no basis for a prior expectation of what the finding would be 
once health was placed in the same normative footing as other forms of wealth. Health dominates 
because of the high figure for VSL reported in the empirical literature. Longevity matters to 
people everywhere and matters greatly. In democratic societies that should count. 23 
5. Growth in wealth per capita in India has been in great measure a consequence of TFP 
growth (the "residual"). But contemporary estimates of the residual should be trea ted with the 
utmost suspicion, because they are based on models that don't include natural capital as factors 
of production. If the rate at which natural capital is degraded were to increase over a period of 
time, TFP growth obtained from regressions based on those models would be overestimates. The 
implication is more than just ironic. The regressions would misinterpret degradation of the 
environment as increases in knowledge and improvements in institutions. Worse still, the greater 
is the under-coverage of natural capital, the greater is the bias in the estimate of TFP growth. By 
plundering Earth TFP could be raised by as much as the authorities like.  
5 Green National Accounts 
The literature I have sketched in this paper has revealed that the entire architecture of 
contemporary growth and development economics is stacked against nature. No matter where 
you look in official models of economic development, you will find an assumption that 
eliminates natural capital from human activities. It should be no surprise that intuitions built on 
the basis of those models are at odds with the experiences of rural households and communities 
in poor countries. 
Theory guides and helps to shape empirical research. The absence of natural capital in 
growth and development models has meant that contemporary national accounts continue to be 
prepared without mention of the environmental resource base. Although the United Nations 
                                                 
23 Becker, Philipson, and Soares (2005) included longevity increase in estimates of the growth of 
income per head to show that the economic performance of developing countries in recent decades was 
considerably superior to that of rich countries.    
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Statistical Office has constructed satellite accounts that include natural capital, few countries 
treat them as anything more than the proverbial "footnote".  
These are early days in the preparation of wealth accounts. But it is sobering to realize 
that 60-70 years ago estimates of national incomes were subject to uncertainties of a magnitude 
people are minded to think no longer exists in current estimates. In any event we take 
contemporary estimates of national incomes too much at face value. Official estimates are silent 
on the proportion of incomes that have gone unrecorded. Estimates of transactions falling outside 
the market system or operating within a black market system suggest that the errors in official 
estimates of national income are substantial.  
The value of natural capital in Table 1 is probably a serious underestimate. When national 
accounts are better prepared, health and natural capital will in all probability be found to be 
much the most significant component of the wealth of nations. That is also why official 
ignorance of the state of an economy's stock of natural capital assets should now be a matter of 
embarrassment to governments. Kumar (2010) is a pioneering set of studies on the value of 
ecological services, and in a remarkable research programme called the Natural Capital Project, 
Gretchen Daily of Stanford University and Steve Polasky of the University of Minnesota are 
jointly directing the mapping and valuing of ecosystem services in a large number of sites in the 
world. But they are only a beginning and their coverage is such as to be unusable in the study of 
the wealth of nations. Moreover, in a review of the empirical literature on forest services (carbon 
storage, ecotourism, hydrological flows, pollination, health, and non-timber forest products), 
Ferraro et al. (2011) have found little that can be reliably used in wealth estimates. But even if 
figures for natural resource stocks were available, the deep problem of imputing values to them 
would remain. Market prices may be hard facts, but shadow prices are soft. The issue isn't 
merely one of uncertainty about the role natural capita l plays in production and consumption 
possibility, it is also that people differ in their ethical values. The sensitivity of wealth estimates 
to shadow prices should become routine exercise in national accounts. An Expert Group 
convened by the Government of India has recommended in its report on greening the country's 
national accounts (Anant et al., 2013) that in the foreseeable future wealth estimates should be 
attempted only at the sector level (as in rows (1)-(4) in Table 1), and that too within bands; they 
should not be presented as precise figures. Shadow prices are far too fragile to support point 
estimates. 
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That people may never agree on the wealth of nations is, however, no reason for 
abandoning wealth as the object of interest in sustainability analysis. Our ignorance of the 
economic worth of natural capital remains the greatest barrier to an understanding of the history 
of economic development. Until that ignorance is lifted, policy analysis will remain crippled and 
sustainability will continue to be a notion we admire but cannot put into operation.  
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Table 1 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Per capita wealth and its growth in India, 1995-2000 
(2000 US$) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
   (1)      (2)  (3)  (4) 
 
        1995 stock      2000 stock       Change        Growth rate 
 
    (1995-2000)    (% per year) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
(1) Reproducible capital                  1,530          2,180  650              7.30     
(2) Human capital, 1 (education)        6,420          7,440                 1,020              3.00 
(3) Human capital, 2 (health)          500,000      503,750                 3,750              0.14 
(4) Natural capital            2,300          2,280                     -20             -0.15 
 
(5) Oil (net capital gains)                       -140 
(6) Carbon damage                         -90 
 
(7) TOTAL                           510,250     515,650           5,170             0.20 
 
(8) TFP                    1.84 
 
(9) Wealth per capita                  2.04 
____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Source: Arrow et al. (2012), Table 5 (modified). 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 1 
To review the welfare properties of wealth formally, denote by V(t) a scalar index of 
social well-being at date t. Let Ki(t) be the economy's stock of asset i at t and K(t) the vector 
denoting the stocks of the economy's entire set of assets. Thus we write 
K(t) = {K1(t),K2(t),...,Ki(t),...}). 
Social well-being at t depends on the productive base K(t) and the socio-environmental 
processes that are forecast to drive the economy beyond t. Denoting the socio-environmental 
processes symbolically by M, we may write V(t) as V(K(t),M). M reflects not only the ecological 
processes the economy is subject to, but also the workings of institutions. If institutions are 
thought to co-evolve with the level of economic development, M reflects that too. In most case 
studies M is formulated in terms of a set of differential equations reflecting the dynamics of 
socio-environmental processes (for illustrations, see Dasgupta 2004: Appendix; Sengupta, 2013).  
Let ΔX denote a small change in any variable X. Now consider a short interval of time Δt 
starting at t. Sustainable development over the interval [t, t+Δ] would demand that V(K(t),M) 
should not decline. In our notation, V(K(t),M) changes by ΔV(K(t),M). Because Δ represents a 
small change, 
ΔV(K(t),M) = iΣ[∂V(K(t),M)/∂Ki(t)]ΔKi(t).      (A1) 
Let Pi(t) be asset i's shadow price at t. By the definition of shadow prices, we know that 
Pi(t) = ∂V(K(t),M)/∂Ki(t).        (A2) 
Using equation (A2) in equation (A1) and dividing both sides of the resulting equation by Δt, 
yields 
ΔV(K(t),M)/Δt = iΣPi(t)ΔKi(t)/Δt.       (A3) 
Write 
W(t) = iΣ[Pi(t)Ki(t)].         (A4) 
W(t) is the economy's wealth at t. From equations (A3)-(A4) we conclude that social well-being 
increases during [t,t+Δ] if an only if wealth increases during [t,t+Δ].24 
                                                 
24 For the technically minded reader, we recall the theory of dynamic programming and note that 
V(K(t),M) is a "value function." It is a reduced form of an entire dynamical system. For constructing V the 
analyst needs to represent the socio-environmental processes in question by, say, a system of differential 
equations, has to know what the initial asset stocks are, and has to specify the social well-being function 
with which to conduct the evaluation. (For illustrations, see Dasgupta (2004): Appendix). It should be 
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Appendix 2 
The Salience of GDP 
In the text it was shown that GDP is not an index of social well-being. That should come 
as no surprise. The construction of GDP wasn't meant to serve the purposes of economic 
evaluation over the long run. GDP is a measure of market activity and was designed for use in a 
world where a significant proportion of people were unemployed and resources lay idle 
(Kuznets, 1941). The index allows economists to estimate the gap between potential output and 
actual output. Moreover time series of GDP enable macroeconomists to study household and 
corporate behaviour. In addition, as national income is the source of government taxation, 
Finance Ministers are drawn to GDP forecasts. And finally, estimating depreciation and 
obsolescence introduces errors, which is why GDP is appealing to the national income 
statistician. As a criterion for evaluating short run economic policy, GDP has served admirably. 
However, ignoring depreciation of reproducible and human capital and degradation of natural 
capital is indefensible practice in economic evaluation concerning the long run.  
Nevertheless, GDP is so attractive that without international cooperation it would be hard 
for any government on its own to abandon it as an index of economic progress. Why? 
GDP is the market value of final goods and services. Those goods and services can be 
deployed so as to gain advantage in the international sphere. Never mind if a country enjoys a 
large GDP by depleting its natural capital; GDP can be (and is routinely) used by governments 
as a strategic weapon in a world where nations compete against one another for economic and 
political influence. Not only does a nation's status in the world rise if it enjoys GDP growth, high 
GDP enables a nation to tilt the terms of trade with the rest of the world to its advantage. History 
is replete with examples that demonstrate the strategic advantages of GDP growth. 
The competitive advantages associated with GDP growth lead to a to-date unexplored 
form of the "tragedy of the commons": nations vie with one another for competitive advantage 
by bolstering GDP, thereby jeopardizing future well-being within each of their borders. As in 
classic instances of the tragedy, international recognition of the wasteful nature of such a form of 
                                                                                                                                                             
noted that there is no presumption that M is a socially optimum socio-environmental process. 
 For simplicity of exposition, I am supposing that the socio-environmental system under study is 
autonomous, implying that V is not an explicit function of t. M is a parameter in sustainability analysis, 
not a variable. In policy analysis M is a choice variable. Acceptance of a proposed investment project 
changes M ever so slightly. A sequence of acceptances amounts to a sequence of improvements to M.    
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competition is a needed first step in shifting national economic policies toward the accumulation 
of wealth. National accounts shouldn't abandon GDP, but to call for GDP growth and demand 
sustainable development at all times is to seek two incompatible desires.  
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